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Comment  Christopher A. Sims
The chapter sets up a state of the art two- country calibrated model in which 
monetary policy has welfare eﬀects. It uses a second-  order expansion to get 
accurate calculations of these eﬀects, using the model’s own agent utility 
functions, and thereby gives us a prototype of how this analysis should be 
done. But as the authors acknowledge in various caveats in the text, it is 
really only a prototype. There are many aspects of the model that are dubi-
ous and likely to be important to the conclusion. Most of my comments, 
therefore, point out questionable aspects of the chapter. At the end, I provide 
a constructive suggestion.
The Nature of the Game
The chapter models interaction of monetary authorities as a Nash equi-
librium, but the nature of such an equilibrium depends crucially on what 
variables each player treats as given when choosing the player’s own moves. 
The chapter’s central case is that each monetary authority takes the entire 
past and future of the other’s money stock as given in optimizing its own 
money stock choice. This is certainly unrealistic, and the chapter’s own sensi-
tivity analyses show that its conclusion that the welfare gains from coopera-
tion are small is sensitive to this choice.
It is perhaps worthwhile to catalog the results of the chapter’s sensitivity 
analysis: if the policy choice variables are the time paths of interest rates, 
the result is instability—in other words, extremely large welfare losses from 
noncooperation. The same is true if the policy choice variable is the pro-
ducer price index (PPI). If the choice variable is consumer price index (CPI) 
path, the losses from noncooperation are ﬁ  nite, but ten times larger than in 
the case where the money time path is the choice variable. When the choice 
variables are the coeﬃcients in a Taylor rule, the losses from noncooperation 
are minuscule, but “cooperation” in the choice of these coeﬃcients leaves the 
equilibrium welfare far from the Ramsey optimal solution—by an amount 
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of the same order of magnitude as the cost of noncooperation with the CPI 
choice variable.
This last observation suggests another reason to consider the chapter’s 
results skeptically: except for the experiment with policy rule coeﬃcients as 
choice variables, monetary authorities are assumed to set policy with com-
plete information as to the nature of the shocks that have hit the economy, 
when in fact one of the key conundrums of monetary policy is the diﬃculty 
of being sure what the nature of recent shocks has been. This is why both 
the cooperative and noncooperative Taylor rule equilibria in the chapter give 
lower welfare than Ramsey: the Taylor rule policies depend only on a few 
clearly observable variables, while the Ramsey policies (and the other Nash 
policies in the chapter) do not impose such a constraint.
Notice that I have been talking about the “costs of noncooperation.” It 
is traditional in this literature to study what are called “gains from coop-
eration.” This suggests that we are studying the eﬀects of doing something 
new in the way of cooperation. But in this chapter, and probably in reality, 
historically estimated policy rules give rise to behavior that is much closer to 
the fully cooperative equilibrium than to the noncooperative equilibrium. In 
fact, central banks are acutely aware of the likely reactions of other central 
banks to their own policy actions, and few now make policy, or assume that 
others make policy, based on M time paths. We are probably, therefore, in an 
equilibrium much more sophisticated than Nash equilibrium, with reputa-
tion playing an important role. Nonetheless, it is worth asking what could 
go wrong if central banks did attempt “beggar thy neighbor” policies, and 
the chapter should be considered in that light.
There is an interesting and consequential monetary policy game going on 
right now, involving international policy interactions that are not considered 
in this chapter. Will the United States take advantage of its ability to reduce 
domestic ﬁ  scal obligations by inﬂ  ating away the value of its debt? Will non-
U.S. monetary authorities be tempted to be the “ﬁ  rst to unload” U.S. nomi-
nal debt? Doepke and Schneider (2006) argue that the beneﬁ  ts to the U.S. 
population as a whole of doing this are at an historic high. In the chapter’s 
model, though, only U.S. nominal securities are traded. In fact, valuation 
eﬀects depend on net positions in assets of both (all) denominations. These 
eﬀects are large relative to those analyzed in this chapter.
Other Dubious Aspects of the Model and the Results
The model is calibrated to make about 70 percent of output explained 
by productivity and labor supply shocks in the long run. These long-  run 
percentages are very poorly pinned down in the data; across diﬀerent early 
Smets/Wouters papers the percentages jump around, in some cases with 
technology shocks given a minor role. At one-   and two-  year horizons, the 
percentages attributed to productivity shocks are usually much smaller. Is 194    Günter Coenen, Giovanni Lombardo, Frank Smets, and Roland Straub
that true here? This chapter’s percentages are at the upper end of the range 
in the literature ﬁ  tting big, multishock models. The chapter cites papers by 
Smets and Wouters from 2003 and 2007 that display estimated dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models of the euro area and the United 
States, respectively, to support its speciﬁ  cation that 70 percent of output 
variance is accounted for by technology and labor supply shocks. But in 
the ﬁ  rst of those papers, for the euro area, the percentages of long- run vari-
ance in output accounted for by technology, labor supply, markup shocks, 
and monetary policy shocks are 8, 33, 3, and 28, respectively, whereas in 
the current chapter the corresponding percentages are 55, 20, 1, and 6. The 
percentages in the later paper, about the United States, are in line with the 
percentages in the current chapter, but in that paper the markup shocks 
account for almost no long-  run variance, even for inﬂ  ation.
Because technology shocks oﬀer little room for monetary policy to oﬀset 
them, it seems likely that the large role attributed to technology shocks might 
be a reason for the chapter’s small estimates of the welfare eﬀects of mon-
etary policy coordination. In fact, the chapter’s own discussion makes clear 
that “markup shocks” are the dominant source of gains from cooperation. 
It would have been useful, therefore, to see a sensitivity analysis in which the 
relative sizes of the shock variances were varied over the range observed in 
the empirical literature.
The model assumes full insurance of individual labor income ﬂ  uctua-
tions. Modeling the distribution of the heterogeneous eﬀects of aggregate 
ﬂ  uctuations on individuals may not be important for matching aggregate 
time series behavior, but for welfare evaluation it is critical. Despite habit 
in consumption, the model implies very limited welfare losses from volatile 
responses of interest rates, consumption, and gross domestic product (GDP) 
to markup shocks in the noncooperative solution. This conclusion would 
probably change if the limited insurability of the eﬀects of most individual 
job losses were taken into account.
The chapter’s model contains “markup shocks” and “uncovered interest 
parity” (UIP) shocks. The markup shocks play a central role in generating 
inﬂ  ation, while in the calibrated model the UIP shocks, though large, are 
unimportant in explaining other variables. Because the interpretation of 
these shocks is unclear, the assumptions about their properties should be 
checked. The markup shocks are treated in the model as a varying subsidy to 
production, but there is obviously no such thing in reality. Of course other 
interpretations are possible, but since the shocks are somewhat ill-  deﬁ  ned, 
the assumption that they are orthogonal to other shocks, and particularly 
policy shocks, should be checked. The same is true for the large UIP shocks. 
In both cases, it is assumed that the shocks are orthogonal to other shocks, 
but by calculating the implied values of the shocks in the actual data, it 
should be possible to check whether the estimated realized shocks are rea-
sonably close to satisfying these assumptions.International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation    1 9 5
The model does “microfounded” welfare calculations, using the model’s 
own speciﬁ  cation of agents’ utility function. But in the model the house-
hold utility function and the technology include elements (habit persistence, 
investment adjustment costs, and shocks thereto) that help match macro 
time series facts but have little direct micro empirical support. The Calvo 
pricing leads to welfare costs arising from dispersion in output levels across 
ﬁ  rms. It is doubtful that this is the main source of costs of inﬂ  ation, and 
there is again no empirical microfoundation for this aspect of the “micro-
founded” macro model. Idiosyncratic price volatility, combined with slug-
gish response of price aggregates to monetary policy, emerges naturally from 
information-  theoretic models. But these would have very diﬀerent welfare 
implications.
Because the welfare measure is therefore of uncertain value, it would be 
interesting to have more discussion of what the eﬀects of noncooperation are 
on the behavior of the economy generally, as opposed to eﬀects on the one- 
dimensional welfare measure. The responses of the economies to markup 
shocks are drastically diﬀerent in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Interest rates, consumption, and GDP oscillate widely for several periods in 
response to these shocks, as the monetary authorities try, without success, 
to shift negative eﬀects onto each other. If we thought the model reliable in 
predicting eﬀects of policy changes on model variables, we might well char-
acterize these diﬀerences between noncooperative and cooperative solutions 
as big, not small.
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